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GERMANY AND THE EGYPTIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 1882-1918

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We can distinguish between two different phases in the attitude of Germany towards Egypt and the Egyptian Question, the first marked by the emergence of Germany as a unified state and the second by the conclusion of the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of April 8, 1904.

In the first phase, the German foreign policy was designed to exploit the contradictions between the three rivals: Britain, France and Russia, in order to avoid a European conflict that might involve Germany and obstruct her endeavours to build a powerful national state. At that stage, Germany encouraged the imperialist ambitions of France in Northern Africa, and that of Britain in Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean.¹

So far as Egypt was concerned, Germany showed no sympathy to the Egyptian Nationalist Movement either before or after the British occupation. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kamel, the leader of the nationalist movement and founder of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, was hoping to change the German neutral attitude in favour of the Egyptian Question. He believed that Germany was able to find a prompt solution to the Egyptian Question in collaboration with France and Russia if the Egyptian nationalist point of view was made clear to both the German Opinion and German government. That could be done through the organization of Press campaigns in Germany to propagate the Egyptian nationalist views, and opening talks between an Egyptian nationalist delegation and the German government to convince them with the nationalist views and gain their support.²

Mustafa Kamel proposed to Khedive Abbas II to extend an invitation to the Kaiser's family to visit Egypt in the winter of 1896, a proposal that was not appreciated by the Khedive who did not like to raise the British hostilities against

¹ Yerusalimsky, Arkady: German Imperialism, Its Past and Present, Moscow 1969, pp. 27-8.

² Dunyā , Abd al-Azīz: Rasā'il tārīkhiyya min Mustafā Kāmil ilā Fu'ād Salīm Higāzī, Cairo 1969, pp. 45-6.

him. Mustafa Kamel thought that such invitation would favour the Kaiser and associate him with the Egyptian nationalist views. If that was accompanied by a well-organized Press campaign in three influential German newspapers, a miracle could be done and the German attitude towards the Egyptian Question might be favourable to the Egyptian national aspirations.³

Although Khedive Abbas II was not in complete agreement with Mustafa Kamel's views, the latter did not lose hope in changing the German negative attitude. He paid two visits to Berlin in January and April 1897. In his first visit, he made a statement to the newsmen in which he explained the Egyptian Question and requested the German Opinion's support. He appealed to the German Government, as well, for support and called for a positive action towards the Egyptian Question.⁴ But the German response to Mustafa Kamel's activities in Berlin was negative, and he had to exclude Germany from his endeavours to gain the support of the contradictory European Powers. Certainly, Germany was not then ready to act against the British interests in Egypt by adopting a favourable attitude towards the Egyptian nationalist movement.

By 1900, the international political arena witnessed certain changes that gradually paved the way for the second phase in the German policy towards Egypt and the Egyptian Question. Germany's policy of exploiting the contradictions between her rivals; Britain, France and Russia, suffered a major setback. German imperialism took advantage of the Boer War to penetrate deeper into Turkey and China in an endeavour to elbow out Britain. Hence, the Anglo-German naval rivalry, the beginning of the British policy of encircling Germany and the Moroccan crisis.

Soon, after the Russo-Japanese War started or, more precisely, on April 8, 1904, Britain and France concluded an agreement recognizing Britain's "right" to Egypt and France's "right" to press her claims in Morocco.⁵ Germany waged opposition against the Entente Cordiale, but Britain assured her that her interests in Egypt would be safeguarded and German trade with Egypt would receive the most favourable treatment if she gave her recognition to the British interests in Egypt and ceased to act against the British occupation there. The dispute was settled by exchanging notes through diplomatic channels.⁶

However, the Anglo-German imperialist antagonism at the turn of the early twentieth century was not only the prelude to the First World War, but also to the

³ Mustafa Kamel to Khedive Abbas II, September 19, 1895.

⁴ al-Rāfiʿī, 'Abd al-Rahmān: Mustafā Kāmil, Cairo 1962, pp. 92,98.

⁵ Yerusalimsky: op. cit., pp. 35, 54.

⁶ Mansfield, Peter: The British in Egypt, New Abbot 1973, pp. 104-5.

second phase of Germany's policy towards Egypt and the Egyptian nationalist movement.

As early as 1905, Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha, Turkish High Commissioner in Egypt, had declared that "with twelve army corps in Syria, and the Germans at our back, it should not be difficult to turn the English out of Egypt".⁷ In 1905, Baron Oppenheim, known to the British as "the Kaiser's spy", organized a large reception for the nationalist leader Mustafa Kamel in Berlin. He was also in close touch with Mukhtar Pasha, and was known to lose no opportunity of reminding the Egyptian nationalist Press of the syllogism that Islam was threatened with extinction by Europe, that Britain and France were at the head of the anti-Islamic movement, that the Sultan was the last hope of the faithful and that Germany was the friend of the Sultan and therefore the only Muslim-minded European Power.⁸

When, in March 1909, the British occupation authorities in Egypt pushed the Egyptian Government towards the reinforcement of the Press Law of 1881, in order to control the nationalist Press and put an end to the severe campaigns against the British occupation policies, Germany declared her discontent. In that occasion the German Press launched a campaign against British policy in Egypt. The *Kölnische Zeitung* attacked, in June 19, 1909, the British Agent in Egypt, denied his claims about the necessity of that law and supported the right of the Egyptians to express their opposition to the British occupation and to call for a constitutional government.⁹

Meanwhile, the German Government was involved in the matter, when *Misr-el-Fatat*, the influential organ of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, sought the Capitulations' protection by passing its ownership, nominally, to a German citizen. Since April 5, 1909, the Paper bearing the name of August Kuhn as owner launched its severest campaign against the British policy and the pro-British government without being liable to the Press Law.¹⁰

The British Government had no other choice but to appeal to the German Government for the application of the Egyptian Press Law of 1881 on the German-owned newspaper in Egypt. But the latter refused on grounds that the Powers did not assent to its promulgation, and claimed that foreigners, owing to their privileged position under the Capitulations, were exempt from the criminal jurisdiction of the Egyptian Government. Germany declared that she had no

⁷ Storrs, Ronald: Orientations, London 1937, p. 141

⁸ . Ibid., p. 141.

⁹ FO. 407/174, Goschen to Grey, June 23, 1909.

¹⁰ Sabat, Khalil & Others: Hurriyyat al-Sihdfa fi Misr 1798-1924, Cairo 1972, p. 202.

intention to act in a manner contrary to the Capitulations and insisted that no judicial proceedings would be taken against a German journalist before the Egyptian tribunals, and no penalty would be enforced against him even administratively. The German authorities stated that if the Egyptian Government were led to decide upon the closing of the German-owned printing press without recourse to the co-operation of the German Consulate in Cairo, the material interests of the proprietor would be safeguarded by his liberty to appeal to the Mixed Tribunals for redress of the damage that he might consider himself to have incurred.¹¹

Eager to reach a compromise, the British ambassador to Berlin Sir E. Goschen presented a memorandum to the German Government declaring that the Egyptian authorities would be able to recognize Kuhn's ownership of *Misr-el-Fatat* if he applied to the Egyptian Ministry of Interior for license recommended by the German Consulate in Cairo. Since such application was conditional in the Press Law, article 7, any affirmative answer would mean that the German Government had no objection on the application of the Law on the German-owned newspapers. Baron Schön the German Foreign Minister informed Sir Goschen the British Ambassador that Germany cannot take any action before consulting with the interested Powers.¹²

However, talks were resumed between the two parties in which Goschen reminded Schön with the German secret Note of June 19, 1904 stating that the German Government would not ask the British to decide a certain date for evacuation of Egypt, describing the case as a matter of native security due to the agitations caused by *Misr-el-Fatat's* campaign, and urging the German government to refrain from supporting the case of Kuhn who was in fact a nominal owner of the Paper. He stated that the Egyptian Government would be obliged to act against the Paper in application of the Press Law regardless the official German views.¹³

The German authorities had no other choice but to request the British Government to postpone any action to be taken in Cairo until they received formal response from Germany. In August 3, 1909, Kuhn the nominal owner of *Misr-el-Fatat* informed the Press Department of the Egyptian Ministry of Interior that he had obtained an appointment in a German factory and was leaving Egypt. He added that he had presented *Misr-el-Fatat* and its printing offices to its old staff. At the same time, Count Metternich, the German Ambassador to London, informed the

¹¹ FO. 407/174, Graham to Grey, August 8, 1909

¹² F.O. 407/174, Goschen to Grey, June 14, 1909.

¹³ F.O. 407/174, Goschen to Grey, June 23, 1909.

Foreign Office that Kuhn had been ordered to leave Egypt when the German authorities realized that his property title was not proper, and the Egyptian authorities might be free to take any action against *Misr-el-Fatat*.

Misr-el-Fatat had since to appear with Kuhn's name as proprietor on the title page. Having the notion that the real owners were looking for a substitute to Kuhn, the authorities requested the editor to remove the name in question, and to furnish to the Press Department all information with regard to the Paper as required by the Press Law.¹⁴ Deprived of the German protection, the real proprietors of *Misr-el-Fatat* responded to the authorities, changed their tone when dealing with the British policy in Egypt and shifted from direct to indirect critique.¹⁵

If Germany acted in different way and force was employed, the Egyptian Government would be involved in Anglo-German incident. In Berlin again, Baron Schön had assured the British Ambassador that Germany was anxious to oblige over the abolition of the Capitulations and persuade the other Powers to agree. At the same time, he had answered the Italian Ambassador that the "great Powers should fast to what they had got".¹⁶

The assassination of Butrus Ghali Pasha the Egyptian Premier by an extreme nationalist in February 1910, gave the British authorities valuable opportunity to eliminate the nationalist movement. A special political police department was created to tighten the scale of nationalist activities, detain the nationalist cadres and suppress opposition. Such situation obliged the suspected nationalist cadres to find refuge abroad. Some of them went to Germany where they had been welcomed.

Thus, Germany continued to show her sympathy to the Egyptian nationalist movement but without causing serious troubles to the British occupation. When Muhammed Farid, the successor of Mustafa Kamel in the leadership of both nationalist movement and the Egyptian Nationalist Party, visited Berlin in the autumn of 1910, he was warmly received by the German Opinion. He was invited to a meeting organized by the Colonial Club to lecture on the Egyptian Question. The meeting had been opened by a speech from Dr. Weigelt who expressed the Germans' sympathy with the Egyptian nationalist cause, then followed by Farid and some other Egyptian Nationalists. The meeting was reported by the German Press and Farid had satisfaction of the results.¹⁷

¹⁴ F.O. 407/174, Graham to Grey, August 8, 1909.

¹⁵ Sabat & Others: op. cit., pp. 210-11.

¹⁶ Storrs: op. cit., p. 141.

¹⁷ Farid, Muhammad: *Mudhakkirdti baed al-Hijra* (Memoirs), note No 2, p. 50.

Hence, the relations between Germany and the Egyptian nationalist movement were cemented, and by the declaration of the First World War the climax of their mutual co-operation was reached.

At the beginning of the War, there had been a wave of anti- British and Germanophil feeling among the Egyptians. Strong anti- British sentiments were common, and the Anglo-Russian Alliance was traditionally distasteful alike to Muslims and to the powerful Austro-Jewish families of Alexandria. But the wealthier stratum who gained much from the occupation's economic policies, understood that even if the legends of German brutality and colonial repression were exaggerated, their advent would signify at best the substitution of unknown for a known evil. The most striking features of the opposition factions were the apparent vigour and thoroughness with which the middle-class; Turco-Circassians, lawyers, students and nationalist journalists had absorbed, and continued to impart to others, the doctrine of affectionate and even passionate interest in and expectation of German success. For them, Germany was the one great Power that had befriended Islam without acquiring an acre of Muslim territory, and the Kaiser's Syrian journey, and his noble generosity in providing two battleships in place of those maliciously and at the last moment withheld by the British when most needed, were cited as evidence of Germany's unanimity to Islam.¹⁸

On the other hand, Germany had the notion that Egypt was particularly susceptible to an explosive mass uprising, for in Egypt the precedents of the Urabi and Mahdist revolts already existed. Kaiser Wilhelm was unshakably convinced that a surprise offensive against the Suez Canal would touch off enough unrest to disrupt British communications throughout the entire Near East. But whether or not the revolt gained momentum, the German High Command favoured any offensive capable of paralyzing the Canal even temporarily, thereby undermining the Allied war effort in Europe-their major concern.¹⁹

It was the reason behind German endeavours to attract the leadership of the Egyptian nationalist movement to a broad field of mutual co-operation. The nationalist leaders were then in exile, itinerant between European countries and Istanbul, since the British occupation authorities had launched their elimination campaign against the Nationalist Party.

At the beginning of the War, Muhammed Farid made his headquarters in Istanbul when he was approached by the German Embassy there. In September 11, 1914, Weber the oriental secretary informed Farid that Germany was ready to supply the

¹⁸ Storrs: op. cit., p. 154.

¹⁹ Sachar, Howard: The Emergence of the Middle East 1914-1924, London 1970, pp. 39-40.

Egyptian nationalists with armaments and military experts if they could revolt against the British.²⁰ Such generous offer that never realized, convinced Muhammed Farid to bet on Germany thinking that victorious Germany could help the Egyptian nationalist aspirations owing to her interests in the Suez Canal and influence in Istanbul.

Muhammed Farid had suspicions about the post-war intentions of the Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.) towards Egypt. Through discussions with the leading figures of the C.U.P. government, he sensed that they wanted to withdraw the privileges bestowed on Egypt by the firmans of 1841, 1873 and turn her into a mere province controlled by the Turkish government in Istanbul. Such apparent intentions widened the gap between the C.U.P. and the leadership of the Egyptian Nationalist Party and brought the latter close to Germany thinking that they might use the German influence in Istanbul to safeguard the autonomous rights of Egypt.²¹

In that direction, Farid persuaded Khedive Abbas II who was then in Switzerland, to have an audience with the Kaiser to gain his support to the Egyptians' nationalist aspirations.²² Since the British announced his deposition for collaborating with their enemies, the Khedive was hesitant to show his links with Germany. He was afraid that the British might confiscate his property in Egypt if he made such initiative. Thus, he stayed in Switzerland for two years trying not to commit himself to either side, and embezzling large sums provided by the Germans to purchase controlling shares in the leading Paris newspapers through his financial agent Polo Pasha.²³

Having lost hope in the Khedive, Farid took the initiative and opened discussions with the Germans through their ambassador to Vienna in December 1914, expressing fears of the Egyptian nationalists concerning the C.U.P.'s policies and requesting Germans to use their good offices to persuade the Ottomans to issue a declaration of intentions regarding Egypt. Such declaration might assure the Egyptians about the future of their country if the autonomous rights of Egypt were formally confirmed. Farid complained to the Germans of the grand vezir

²⁰ Farid: op. cit., note No 3, p. 88.

²¹ Ibid., No 4, p. 112-13.

²² Ibid., p. 110.

²³ Goldschmidt, Arthur: The Egyptian Nationalist Party 1882-1919. in Holt (ed.): Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt, London 1968, p. 329.

Muhammed Said Halim Pasha who was obstructing the nationalist activities to promote his own claims to the Egyptian Khedivate.²⁴

When he visited Berlin in January 1915, Muhammed Farid resumed discussions with Zimmermann, the under-secretary of Foreign Affairs. He warned Zimmermann that if the Anglophil Halim Pasha kept his position as grand vezir, the Germano-Turkish war effort will be endangered. He again explained the necessity of promulgating an Ottoman Declaration (*irāda saniyya*) to confirm the autonomous privileges of Egypt. Zimmerman gave his word that the Egyptian nationalist views would be considered and the Ottoman Declaration on the future of Egypt would be issued in the suitable time.²⁵

It did not take much to issue the *irāda saniyya* which had been announced by Sultan Muhammed V in February 12, 1915.²⁶ It seems that the Germans could convince their Turkish allies of the necessity of its promulgation to assure the Egyptians concerning the future of their country and gain their support to the military campaign on the Suez Canal which was in preparation.

In a meeting with the German ambassador in Istanbul, Muhammed Farid was informed that "the main target of the campaign was to liberate Egypt from the British occupation and to give the Egyptians an opportunity to elect their own government at their convenience".²⁷ Therefore, Farid believed that the Egyptian Nationalists should participate in the "liberation campaign", make efforts to communicate with the nationalist secret societies in Egypt and supply them with armaments; such problems could not be solved without German co-operation.

Again, Farid went to Berlin in May 1915, where he conferred with Wesendonck the chief of the Near Eastern Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He discussed with the German diplomat the question of smuggling armaments into Egypt and was informed that the matter would be under careful investigation by the German authorities who might refer to Farid for further information whenever they make a decision concerning that matter.²⁸

Three weeks later, Baron Oppenheim the well-known expert of Arab and Egyptian affairs, was despatched to Syria in a mission to activate the pro-German propaganda and to find a way for communication with the secret nationalist

²⁴ Farid: op. cit., No 4, p. 111.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 113.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 118.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 115-16.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 132.

societies in Egypt and smuggling armaments into the country. In Istanbul, he studied with Farid the question of armaments and communications with Egypt, but without crucial results. Farid's Memoirs, our source of information about the nationalist contacts with Germany do not provide farther details.

However, the Germans were thinking of a surprise offensive against the Suez Canal to disrupt British communications throughout the entire Near East, thereby undermine the Allied war effort in Europe. They were not thinking of Egypt's liberation and organization of an Egyptian armed resistance against the British so far as the military campaign could fulfill their strategic targets. Within those limits, Germany tried to exploit the Egyptian nationalist aspirations in serving her strategic aims without certain commitments.

When Muhammed Farid suggested to Zimmermann in January 1916, that some leading nationalists including himself might go to Syria to escort the campaign and despatch publications to Egypt from there in collaboration with the German Air Force, Zimmermann hesitated to give a prompt affirmative response, claiming that Djemal Pasha refused to accept high-ranking German Staff officers in his Command, and that Germany was finding great difficulty in dealing with the Turks concerning the campaign.

Although Zimmermann told Farid that he appreciated what the latter had mentioned regarding the necessity of having Egyptian civil experts to be beside the military command when they enter Egypt to form a native government, and informed Farid in January 22, 1916 that instructions were given to the German ambassador in Istanbul to facilitate Farid's departure to Syria, Baron Oppenheim who was acting in conformity with the German Foreign Ministry could convince Farid to give up the idea.²⁹

After the failure of the Suez Canal campaign, Germany's interest in Egypt diminished and she became more likely to freeze contacts with the Egyptian nationalist leadership. When Muhammed Fared applied for a German entry visa in November 1916, he had to wait for two months, and he could not receive affirmative answer before writing to Zimmermann who became minister of Foreign Affairs.³⁰ Farid understood that the Germans behaved in such manner in favour of the C.U.P. government with whom the Egyptian nationalists were on bad terms.

²⁹ Ibid., No 7, p. 188.

³⁰ Ibid., No 8, pp. 222, 226.

However, the German Foreign Ministry did not sever relations with the Egyptian nationalist leadership, the Foreign Minister Zimmermann gave Muhammed Farid two audiences in January and May 1917, when the latter transferred his headquarters to Berlin. Farid's main concern was to convince the German minister of the necessity of a second campaign on Egypt, but Zimmermann told him that the military situation would not allow even thinking of such campaign, and that elevating submarine war against Britain and France would bring them to their knees; thus Germany can dictate whatever settlements she likes including that of Egypt.

When Farid expressed the Egyptian Nationalists' fears of neglecting reference to Egypt in the communications exchanged between Germany and U.S.A. on the peace proposals while reference was made to Ireland and India, Zimmermann claimed that Egypt had been included in the German general proposals concerning North Africa. But Farid drew the minister's attention to the importance of Egypt to the German interests in the Near East, especially the Suez Canal, that were worth to be considered in such communication. To escape the debate, Zimmermann smiled and said: "We shall correct that mistake whenever we get the opportunity".³¹

Feeling that Germany had become less interested in the Egyptian Question, Muhammed Farid and the Egyptian Nationalists appealed to the German political parties and influential politicians for support. Hence, Farid approached certain Reichstag members, leaders of the Socialist, Catholic and German Nationalist parties, and journalists. Through them the Egyptian Nationalists were introduced to the "Wednesday Society", an association of politicians; e.g. statesmen, high-ranking army and navy officers, bankers, and political parties' leaders.

Muhammed Farid had the notion of convincing the Reichstag members to open a debate on the Egyptian Question, thinking that it might oblige the German Government to declare her policy regarding Egypt. He had no doubt that the Egyptian Nationalists might gain the support of the German political circles if they were given the opportunity to place their case before a meeting of the "Wednesday Society".

In January 30, 1918, Farid and the members of the Administrative Committee of the Egyptian Nationalist Party were invited to dine with the "Wednesday Society" members. The meeting was opened by a speech from Herr Stein the editor of the Vossische Zeitung, followed by Abdul-Malik Hamza who explained the Egyptian

³¹ Ibid., No 9, pp. 229-231.

Question and the nationalist views in details. The Society members showed their concern when Dr. Paul von Schwabach, a retired ambassador, criticized his country's policy as regards the Egyptian Question, especially her secret Note to Britain on the Entente Cordiale to safeguard her commercial interests in Egypt without regard to the strategic value of Egypt and the Suez Canal.³² It was the first time for the Egyptian Nationalists to know about that imperialist bargain.

Meanwhile the German politicians were fully occupied by the War problems when their country was preparing for her last offensive in the West in the spring of 1918. The Reichstag members were busy with the debates on peace with or without annexation. In short, at that time Germans had to solve their own problems before thinking about the others, a fact that was beyond the Egyptian Nationalists' imagination.

Therefore, in April 1918, the Nationalist leaders approached some German politicians to join membership of a Germano-Egyptian association bearing the name of "Egypt Liberation Society". They received affirmative answers from eminent statesmen such as Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Stresemann, the Liberal leader, Westarop, the Conservative leader and the Kaiser's brother-in-law, von Schleswig Holstein, who accepted to be president of the Society. But the Society has never been founded due to Germany's critical situation in those decisive months as the defeat was obviously seen.³³

Nevertheless, the notion of finding way for communication with the nationalist factions in Egypt came out when the Germans were fighting with the Turks their last battle in the East. In co-ordination with the Turks and the leaders of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, the Germans invited Abdul-Rahman Azzam to Berlin in May 1918, where he studied with Muhammed Farid a plan for communication with the Nationalists in Egypt through Tripolitania, which Azzam knew very well since his participation in the Tripolitanian War 1911-1912.

Secretly, Azzam started from Pola, the Austrian port on the Adriatic, on board of a German submarine, and reached his destination by the end of May. Farid received his first message from Tripolitania in June 5, 1918, through the German Navy, in which Azzam informed Farid that he could establish communication with the Nationalists in Egypt using certain ciphers. He requested printing equipment to be

³² Ibid., No 10, pp. 277-78.

³³ Ibid., pp. 268-69.

used for printing leaflets. The materials in question were smuggled to him by the German Navy.³⁴

The Germans were still dreaming of an explosive mass uprising in Egypt to lessen the British pressure on Syria and undermine the Allied war effort in the Near East, but it was too late. The British troops moved on into Northern Syria to take Damascus, the Turks were prepared to admit the defeat and in October 30, they signed an armistice. It was not reasonable to maintain communications with the Nationalists in Egypt, and the Germans terminated Azzam's mission in Tripolitania.

Although Farid appealed to Germany for support, he refrained from committing himself with the German Islamic propaganda when he was approached by the Foreign Ministry to take part in editing *al-Jihad*, a German organ issued in 1915 that appeared in various Islamic languages including Arabic. He believed that Germany sought to control the Pan-Islamic ideas to serve her own interests, and warned Talat Bey the Turkish minister of Interior that leaving the Pan-Islamic propaganda in the German hands might endanger the Ottoman Empire, unless the latter takes the initiative. In various occasions, he told Zimmermann that he was thinking of a Pan-Islamic Union modelled on the same lines as the Pan-Germanic Union, to be founded after the War and led by the Ottomans, but each Muslim country should enjoy autonomy and share equal rights with the Turks. He believed that an alliance between the Germanic and Islamic Unions would be the stronghold against the imperialist European Powers.³⁵

When the German authorities proposed, in August 1918, a plan aiming at mobilizing the Egyptian Nationalists who were living in Switzerland by a certain office financed by Germany to help their nationalist aspirations, Farid and the leaders of the Egyptian Nationalist Party sensed that the German Intelligence were behind the offer and refused to be used by them.³⁶

However, the armistice of October 1918 and the obvious defeat of Germany had put an end to the hopes of the Egyptian Nationalists in Germany. The defeat did not only affect Germany, but also the future of the Egyptian Nationalist Party's leadership. In Egypt, they were losing ground to the new nationalist leadership of al-Wafd and Sa'ad Zaghloul. Although the pre-war Nationalists remained active as individuals in Europe and as a party in Egypt, they ceased to constitute an

³⁴ Ibid., p. 280.

³⁵ Ibid., No 4, p. 132.

³⁶ Ibid., No 10, pp. 285-86.

important bloc in Egyptian politics after the rise of al-Wafd and the death of Muhammed Farid.

On the other hand, Germany ceased to show her interest in Egypt until the rise of the Third Reich, when Nazi Germany started to open new channels with certain Egyptian nationalist factions.